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Abstract 
  Privacy and security are often intertwined. 
For example, identity theft is rampant because we 
have become accustomed to authentication by 
identification. To obtain some service, we provide 
enough information about our identity for an 
unscrupulous person to steal it (for example, we give 
our credit card number to Amazon.com). One of the 
consequences is that many people avoid e-commerce 
entirely due to privacy and security concerns. The 
solution is to perform authentication without 
identification. In fact, all on-line actions should be as 
anonymous as possible, for this is the only way to 
guarantee security for the overall system. A 
credential system is a system in which users can 
obtain credentials from organizations and 
demonstrate possession of these credentials. Such a 
system is anonymous when transactions carried out 
by the same user cannot be linked. An anonymous 
credential system is of significant practical relevance 
because it is the best means of providing privacy for 
users. 
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1.Introduction 
 
 As information becomes increasingly 
accessible, protecting the privacy of individuals 
becomes a more challenging task. To solve this 
problem, an application that allows the individual to 
control the dissemination of personal information is 
needed. In this paper we discuss about the best 
known  idea for  such a system called the 
Anonymous Credential  System. 
 
    An anonymous credential(AC) is a vector of 
attributes certified by a trusted certification authority. 
Anonymous credentials are used as a way to prevent 
disclosure of too much information about a user 
during the authentication process. Access 
management systems create profiles for each user 
who has been granted access. Additionally, some 
systems use digital certificates to further verify the 
user's identity. Depending on the system, these digital 
certificate's may contain a lot of information about an 
individual user's identity. Since the  entire digital 
certificate  is used during authentication, if 
compromised it could lead to a breach of sensitive 
information about the user, some of which could be 
used later for stealing the legitimate user's identity or 
authentication credentials for malicious access. The  
technology was also called minimal disclosure 
certificates by Stefan Brands. 
 
 Here's a scenario to explain how it works. 
someone goes into a bar and the bartender asks for 
the person's driver's license to verify if he or she is of 
legal age to drink. Most likely, the bartender just 
looks at the person's date of birth and isn't interested 
in the name, address or other personal information. 
Once the bartender is satisfied, the person puts their 
license away and is allowed to stay in the bar. But in 
open network's -- like the Web and the Internet -- an  
entire digital certificate may be exposed to the whole 
world over the wire, where its contents can be sniffed 
and stolen by hacker's interested in stealing 
authentication credentials. Minimal disclosure solve 
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that problem by only providing enough information 
from the user's digital certificate to grant access to a 
system for a specific requirement. the user's whole 
identity or credentials aren't served up to the system 
requesting authentication. 
 An anonymous credential system consists of 
users and organizations. Organizations know the 
users only by pseudonyms. Different pseudonyms of 
the same user cannot be linked.  Yet , an organization 
can issue a credential to a pseudonym, and the 
corresponding user can prove possession of this 
credential to another organization(who knows her by 
a different pseudonym),without revealing anything 
more than the fact that she owns such a credential. 
Credentials can be for unlimited use (multiple-show 
credentials)or for one-time use(one-show 
credentials). 
 
 
2.Motivation 
  
 The internet, by design, lacks provisions for 
identifying who communicates with whom; it lacks a 
well-designed identity infrastructure. As a result, 
enterprises, governments and individuals have over 
time developed a bricolage of isolated, incompatible, 
partial solutions to meet their needs in 
communications and transactions. The overall result 
of these unguided developments is that enterprises 
and governments have a problem in identifying their 
communication partners at the individual level. Given 
the lack of a proper identity infrastructure, 
individuals often have to disclose more personal data 
than strictly required. In addition to name and address 
contact details such as multiple phone numbers 
(home, work, mobile) and e-mail addresses are 
requested. The amount and nature of the data 
disclosed exceeds that usually required of real world 
transactions, which can often be conducted 
anonymously – in many cases the service could be 
provided without any personal data at all. Over the 
long run, the inadequacy of the  identity 
infrastructure affects individuals' privacy. The 
availability of abundant personal data to enterprises 
and governments has a profound impact on the 
individual's right to be let alone as well as on society 
at large. 
 
3. Desirable Properties 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Basic Desirable Properties 
 
i) It should be possible for a user to selectively 
disclose attributes. 
ii)  An  AC must be hard to forge. 
iii) A user's transactions must be unlinkable  and 
iv) An AC must be revokable 
 
 
3.2  Additional Desirable Properties 
 
i) Users should be discouraged from sharing their 
pseudonyms and credentials with other users. ( PKI 
assured non- transferability  or  all-or-nothing non-
transferability) 
ii) It may be desirable to have a mechanism for 
discovering the identity of a user whose transactions 
are illegal. 
iii)It can also be beneficial to allow one-show 
credentials ie, credentials that should only be usable 
once and should incorporate an offline double 
spending test. 
 
 
4.Requirements 
 
 A basic credential system has users, 
organizations, and verifiers as types of players. Users 
are entities that receive credentials. The set of users 
in the system may grow over time. Organizations are 
entities that grant and verify the credentials of the 
users. Each organization grants a unique (for 
simplicity of exposition) type of credential. Finally, 
verifiers are entities that verify credentials of the 
users.  
 For the purposes of non-transferability, we 
can add a CA(Certification Authority) to the model 
who verifies that the users entering the system 
possess an external public and secret key. This CA 
will be trusted to do his job properly.  
 To allow revocable anonymity, an 
anonymity revocation manager can be added. This 
entity will be trusted not to use his ability to find out 
a user's identity or pseudonym unless dictated to do 
so. The user is anonymous until the revocation 
manager exposes his/her identity. Usually this is 
followed by entering the user ID into a revocation 
list. Revocation may be partial  or total. In the former 
a subset of the entries in the vector is revoked, while 
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in the latter the whole vector is revoked.(ie. the user 
is revoked.) Ideally revocation authority should not 
be able to revoke capriciously. 
 
 Finally, a credential may include an 
attribute, such as an expiration date. 
 
5. Related Work 
 
 The scenario with multiple users who, while 
remaining anonymous to the organizations, manage 
to transfer credentials from one organization to 
another, was first introduced by Chaum [6]. 
Subsequently, Chaum and Evertse[5] proposed a 
solution that is based on the existence of a semi-
trusted third party who is involved in all transactions. 
However, the involvement of a semi-trusted third 
party is undesirable. 
 The scheme later proposed by Damgard [4] 
employs general complexity theoretic primitives 
(one-way functions and zero-knowledge proofs) and 
is therefore not applicable for practical use. 
Moreover, it does not protect organizations against 
colluding users. The scheme proposed by Chen [3] is 
based on discrete logarithm-based blind signatures. It 
is efficient but does not address the problem of 
colluding users. Another drawback of her scheme and 
the other practical schemes previously proposed is 
that to use a credential several times, a user needs to 
obtain several signatures from the issuing 
organization. 
 Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai, and Wolf [1] 
propose a general credential system. While their 
general solution captures many of the desirable 
properties, it is not usable in practice because their 
constructions are based on one-way functions and 
general zero-knowledge proofs. Their practical 
construction, based on a non-standard discrete-
logarithm-based assumption, has the same problem as 
the one due to Chen [4]: a user needs to obtain 
several signatures from the issuing organization in 
order to use unlinkably a credential several times. 
  Brands provides a certificate system in 
which a user has control over what is known about 
the attributes of a pseudonym. Although a credential 
system with one-show credentials can be inferred 
from his framework, obtaining a credential system 
with multi-show credentials is not immediate and 
may in fact be impossible in practice. Another 
inconvenience of these and the other discrete-
logarithm-based schemes mentioned above is that all 
the users and the certification authorities in these 
schemes need to share the same discrete logarithm 
group. 
 
 
 
  Jan Camenisch & Anna Lysyanskaya [2]  
propose a practical  anonymous credential system 
that is based on the strong RSA assumption and the  
Diffie-Hellman assumption.  They gave the first 
practical solution that allows 1) a user to unlinkably 
demonstrate possession of a credential as many times 
as necessary without involving the issuing 
organization 2) to prevent misuse of anonymity they 
offered optional anonymity revocation for  particular 
transaction. 
  
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
   It appears that a compromise is required , 
either in the security requirements or in the amount of 
trust bestowed  on the participant, in order to achieve 
a practical and efficient anonymous credential 
system. 
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